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Abstract The concept of plasticity has always been
present in the history of developmental biology, both
within the theory of epigenesis and within morphogenesis
studies. However this tradition relies also upon a genetic
conception of plasticity. Founded upon the concepts of
‘‘phenotypic plasticity’’ and ‘‘reaction norm,’’ this genetic
conception focuses on the array of possible phenotypic
change in relation to diversified environments. Another
concept of plasticity can be found in recent publications by
some developmental biologists (Gilbert, West-Eberhard).
I argue that these authors adopt a ‘‘broad conception of
plasticity’’ that is closely related to a notion of develop-
ment as something that is ongoing throughout an organ-
ism’s lifecycle, and has no clear-cut boundaries. However,
I suggest that given a narrow conception of plasticity, one
can define temporal boundaries for development that are
linked to specific features of the morphological process,
which are different from behavioral and physiological
processes.
Keywords Development  EvoDevo  Modern
synthesis  Morphogenesis  Norm of reaction 
Phenotypic plasticity  Plasticity  Wallace’s challenge
Developmental biology has deep roots in the history of the
life sciences. Ontogenesis—how the living being appears
and develops—has always been a major concern for life
scientists and philosophers. In this rather old tradition, the
concept of plasticity was first invoked in the intellectual
context that tried to rehabilitate some sort of Aristotelism.
Henry More (1614–1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688)
refer to the notion of ‘‘plastic nature’’ as an architectonic
force [that already existed in Aristotle (1999)] that explains
the ontogenesis and the organization of living beings. By
referring to plasticity, these authors want to propose an
alternative to the mechanistic view of biological organiza-
tion, developed by famous authors such as Rene´ Descartes
(1596–1650) or Marcello Malpighi (1628–1694). Physical
laws might not be the only way to explain the ability of living
beings to produce new material from the previous genera-
tion.1 Embryologists such as Caspar Friedrich Wolff
(1734–1794) or Hans Driesch (1867–1941) try to determine
the specificity of living beings compared to other natural
beings. Morphogenesis thus becomes a field where the
‘‘plastic’’ ability to generate species-typical forms plays an
important role. By contrast, a different use of plasticity has
been emphasized by geneticists at the beginning of the
twentieth century; this concept of plasticity is founded upon
the notion of ‘‘norm of reaction,’’ which depicts the ‘‘reac-
tions of the genotypical constituents’’ in contact with vari-
ous environments (Johannsen 1911, p. 145). The norm of
reaction is itself understood as a synonym or a subtype of
‘‘phenotypic plasticity’’ defined as the ability to generate
different kinds of form features within a species. More
recently, a growing number of developmental biologists
have referred to ‘‘plasticity’’ as a theoretical tool for evolu-
tionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) (West-Eberhard
2003; Pigliucci 2001; Gilbert and Epel 2009; Pigliucci and
Mu¨ller 2010). Some of these authors argue for a character-
ization of development as a process that ‘‘never stops,’’ i.e., a
process without clear-cut temporal boundaries (West-Eber-
hard 2003; Gilbert 2000/2010). These authors tend to equate
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the concept of ‘‘developmental plasticity’’ with the older
concept of ‘‘phenotypic plasticity’’ that I will define in the
first section of the article.
The main purpose of this article is to examine and dis-
cuss the facts and concepts about plasticity and especially
its relationships with development. In the first part, I review
the two very different research fields to study plasticity in
the literature: genetics and development. Then I show how
the genetic concept of plasticity has been extended in
evolutionary biology, especially in the Modern Synthesis,
leaving aside the developmental concept of plasticity. With
the rise of EvoDevo, the distinction between genetics and
development dissolves and a clarification of the meaning of
plasticity becomes necessary. In the third section, I offer a
clarification based on development and define what I call a
broad conception of plasticity (BC-plasticity) and a narrow
conception of plasticity (NC-plasticity). For BC-plasticity,
development is not limited to the formation of morpho-
logical traits and includes the appearance of behavioral and
physiological traits; however, for NC-plasticity, develop-
ment is limited to the old conception of plasticity and
includes only the formation of morphological traits. After
formulating these distinctions and elaborating a precise
description of these two conceptions of plasticity, I con-
clude in favor of the NC-plasticity conception for ascribing
temporal boundaries to development. I demonstrate that
BC-plasticity is weak, because it relies on a definition of
development without any discernible boundaries, and then
show that with a NC-plasticity conception of development
we can identify temporal boundaries specifically linked to a
definition of the morphological process.
Origins of Plasticity: Two Different Research Pathways
Although plasticity has received renewed attention in recent
years, few reviews have studied this concept from a his-
torical or theoretical point of view. Most of these reviews
have focused on ‘‘phenotypic plasticity,’’ defined as ‘‘the
property of a genotype to produce different phenotypes in
response to distinct environmental conditions’’ (Pigliucci
2001, p. 1). Like Pigliucci’s definition as well as the ‘‘norm
of reaction’’ concept that is the focus of the careful histor-
ical study conducted by Sahotra Sarkar (1999), the pheno-
typic plasticity concept is largely dependent on the
rediscovery of Mendel’s laws and the advent of genetics.
Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, plasticity was
used long before the emergence of genetics, particularly in
embryology to refer to a propensity to generate species-
typical form. The concept of ‘‘morphological process’’
reflects this type of plasticity. I highlight and distinguish
these two concepts of plasticity by referring to the literature
on the subject.
The Genetic Concept of Plasticity
According to Sarkar (1999), Richard Woltereck coined the
term ‘‘Reaktionsnorm’’ in 1909 to explain Daphnia head-
height differences after studying them in different German
lakes, at varying nutrient levels. In order to depict the
phenomenon, he drew some ‘‘phenotypic curves.’’ He used
the term Reaktionsnorm to indicate the totality of the pos-
sible curves. Some time after the rediscovery of Mendel’s
work (1900), he argued that what was inherited from one
generation to another was this Reaktionsnorm. A few years
later, Johannsen (1911, p. 133) endorsed the concept of
reaction norm and argued that what Woltereck depicted
were phenotype curves arising from the ‘‘reaction of the
genotypical constituents’’ in contact with various environ-
ments (Johannsen 1911, p. 145). In Johannsen’s view, a
single phenotypic curve is a norm of reaction. In the US and
in Europe (apart from the Soviet Union), Johannsen’s dis-
tinction between genotype and phenotype became part of
the standard picture of genetics. In this view, the constancy
and the causal efficacy of the genotype will tend to mini-
mize the complexity of genotype–environment interactions.
Whereas norm of reaction remained a relatively unused2
concept in the West, biologists of the Soviet Union
implemented a first experimental program that addressed
the complexity of phenotypic variability (Adams 1980).
In 1926, Vogt introduced two new concepts to describe
the results of this program, expressivity and penetrance.
‘‘Expressivity’’ is defined as the extent of the manifestation
of a mutation; ‘‘penetrance’’ is the proportion of individ-
uals carrying that mutation, whatever the intensity of the
manifestation of the trait. Sarkar (1999) explains that ex-
pressivity and penetrance have progressively been con-
ceived as properties of a given mutation (and, eventually,
the allele), rather than properties of a mutation relative to a
constant genetic background (which they really are). From
such a perspective, the predictable complexity in the
genotype–environment interaction is erased. The purpose
that the new notions serve is to maintain a genetic etiology
in the face of the plasticity of the phenotype induced by
genotype–environment interactions. Plasticity in the phe-
notypic manifestation of a trait becomes a result of a gene’s
expressivity and (indirectly) its penetrance. The purpose
that the new concepts served was to maintain a genetic
etiology in the face of phenotypic plasticity induced by
genotype–environment interactions (Sarkar 1999). At the
same time, in the Western world, Fisher (1918) and Wright
(1920) offered almost equivalent methods to overlook the
complex interaction between genotype and environment. In
the statistical view, expanded after 1950, the heritability in
2 However, as it appears in Leslie Dunn’s book (1965), the notion of
‘‘norm of reaction’’ was known.
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a broad sense (the individual heritability) is interpreted as
the fraction of phenotypic variance that is due to genotypic
variation. The interpretation is valid only if the interaction
of genotype and environment is the same for all genotypes
and all environments. In 1937, Dobzhansky introduced the
norm of reaction to the Anglophone world to emphasize
‘‘phenotypic plasticity,’’ a result of the complexity of gene-
environment interactions leading to phenogenesis (Sarkar
1999). Referring to the example of a mutation in Dro-
sophila funebris where the mutant phenotype does not
manifest for generations after environmental modification
(dry food), but may reappear when the offspring are sup-
plied with moist food, he thinks that even if environmental
factors induce a trait, it is an unchanged norm of reaction,
which is inherited. Because of this specific interpretation of
the reaction norm, and its progressive identification with
the concept of phenotypic plasticity, plasticity became, for
most biologists of the twentieth century, a notion of
genetics (Schmalhausen 1949; Bradshaw 1965; Schlichting
1986; West-Eberhard 1989; Stearns et al. 1991; Scheiner
1993; Sultan 2000).
The Developmental Concept of Plasticity
More’s (1659/2011) and Cudworth’s (1678) metaphysical
reflections about ‘‘plastic natures’’ have been pursued, a
century later, on an empirical mode in embryology. Shirley
Roe shows (1979) that Caspar Friedrich Wolff was, in the
eighteenth century, at the origin of a renewed Aristotelian
interest in epigenesis—the theory that an individual is
developed by successive differentiation of an unstructured
egg rather than by a simple enlarging of a preformed
entity—and opposed to preformationism. To explain the
organization of embryonic development, Wolff postulates
the existence of an unknown force: the vis essentialis,
which obeys laws of nature as does gravity or magnetism.
In his book, Theoria generationis (1759), Wolff set out the
reasons for which animals have a heart, while plants do not.
He explains this phenomenon because animals’ substance
solidifies more slowly than the liquid of plants. Conse-
quently, the motion of fluids, propelled by the vis essenti-
alis, will only form parallel vessels in plants, while in
animals, as the substance is much less quickly stiffened,
branched vessels are formed. For Wolff, matter is not the
passive matter defined by most preformationist theories in
the eighteenth century. He describes a plastic concept of
matter that possesses form, qualities, modes, and attributes
and considers that not all matter is alike; through the
qualities it possesses its nature is determined.
In the early days of experimental embryology, and nearly
a century later, Hans Driesch (1867–1941) describes the egg
during division as a ‘‘harmonious equipotential system.’’
Each cell contains the latent potential (the plasticity) to
produce a complete organism. Differentiation occurs
because the forces that surround the blastomeres (early
embryonic cells) vary according to differences in spatial and
temporal positions of the original cells. Driesch is thus able
to obtain a complete larva from four-cell stage blastomeres
separated from the sea urchin embryo (Driesch 1928). By
referring to the concept of ‘‘developmental potency,’’ he is
the first one to emphasize experimentally the idea of a plastic
or dynamic property, internal to the matter (Dupont and
Schmitt 2004). The progressive organization of the embryo
is explained because of the specific properties and qualities
of the matter and of the structure adopted. Influence of
Wolff’s thought is present in Driesch’s work.
A few years later, Hans Spemann’s (1869–1941) trans-
plantations of cells or specific areas (e.g., the dorsal blas-
topore lip) from a Xenopus embryo to another reveal areas
or cells that can develop normally after transplantation.
A major step in embryology is made when Spemann and
Mangold specify the concept of embryonic organizer
(Spemann and Mangold 1924). Nowadays biologists define
the process of ‘‘embryonic induction’’ as: ‘‘The mechanism
that underlies the conversion of undifferentiated cells into
the unique cells, tissues, organs responsible for the physi-
ological functions of an organism’’ (Hall and Olson 2007,
p. 103). With the spread of the cell theory, one of the great
ambitions of embryology (Johannes Holtfreter; Ross Har-
rison; Viktor Hamburger) is to understand morphogene-
sis—the biological process that causes an organism to
develop its shape—at the cellular level (Dupont and Sch-
mitt 2004, chap 7). Progressively the observation goes from
the whole organism to identify tissue, cell groups, and
finally molecular determinants that appear to be decisive
for the development of the shape. Since the late nineteenth
century, morphogenesis has occupied a common field
between genetics and experimental embryology (Morgan
1934; Waddington 1940) and progressively the study of
morphological processes has tended to focus on the study
of the genetic component of induction.
As I will demonstrate in the last section of the article,
Stuart Newman, Gerd Mu¨ller, Isaac Salazar-Ciudad, and
Ellen Larsen are the contemporary inheritors of the mor-
phogenesis studies tradition. These studies focus on the
particular life history of a species or organism. All the
processes the developing organism goes through during its
life cycle3 are analyzed, and especially its progressive
differentiation. Therefore, a particular attention is given to
the dynamic, morphological processes that characterize the
developmental mechanisms. Because of the influence of
3 A life cycle is a period involving all different generations of a
species succeeding each other through means of reproduction,
whether through asexual reproduction or sexual reproduction (a
period from one generation of organisms to the same identical stage).
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the epigenesis theory on the study of morphogenesis,
plasticity still refers for many biologists to an ability to
generate different kinds of form features within a species
across its life cycle. For these developmental biologists,
plasticity is understood as a feature of morphological
processes and as a property of organisms, and not as a
property of the genotype–phenotype map.
Plasticity in Evolution
The Modern Synthesis brought together Darwinism, Men-
delism, and population genetics in order to provide a
powerful account of the mechanism of evolution. There-
fore, the genetic conception of plasticity is strongly
emphasized (Sarkar 1999). In the Modern Synthesis, the
environment is seen most of the time as an external factor
and is underestimated in the phenotypic change, in com-
parison with the genetic information. Indeed, the definition
that affirms that ‘‘evolution consists of changing, within the
collective genetic resources of populations, the frequencies
of those genetic programs that lead to the successful
development and survival of individuals under prevailing
environmental conditions’’ (Dobzhansky and Boesiger
1983 [emphasis added]) is a verbose paraphrase of the
statement: ‘‘Evolution is a change in the genetic compo-
sition of population’’ (Dobzhansky 1937/1951). According
to this view, biologists consider an average environment in
order to emphasize the role of mutations in the evolution-
ary process. The environment is a disturbing factor for the
evolutionary analysis, so that mutation is the real cause of
variation.
After the first success of the Modern Synthesis in 1950,
development is considered, most of the time,4 pointless in
the study of evolution. It is almost 30 years later that some
philosophers and biologists begin to reexamine the problem
(e.g., Gould 1977; Coleman 1980; Hamburger 1980; Lauder
1982; Wallace 1986). Wallace (1986, p. 149) addresses
what has become the main problem of EvoDevo’s theorists:
‘‘Can embryologists contribute to an understanding of
evolutionary mechanisms?’’. He argues that development is
irrelevant to evolutionary explanations: ‘‘Problems con-
cerned with the orderly development of the individual are
unrelated to those of the evolution of organisms through
time’’ (Wallace 1986). Two views in evolution can be
separated. The first one focuses on organisms and sees
evolution in the light of the vast array of morphologies one
can find in nature; the second one focuses on genetic pro-
grams and sees evolution in terms of changing frequencies.
Since the two views look incommensurable, Wallace refers
to the well-known analogy of an optical illusion, an
example used by psychologists: a sketch, where you might
see in one moment an old woman, in the next a beautiful
young lady, but at no time both images simultaneously. This
analogy, if valid, suggests that biologists cannot see evo-
lution with both views at the same time. Therefore, no
synthetic view is possible. If we consider the distinction
I previously put forward, does this also mean that a con-
ception of plasticity that synthesizes the genetic and the
developmental concepts is not possible either?
The appearance and growth, over the last 25 years, of
EvoDevo, a new field of biology focusing on questions at
the intersection of evolution and development, suggest that
at least some developmental biologists have decided to take
Wallace’s provocative assumption as a challenge (Laub-
ichler and Maienschein 2007; Sansom and Brandon 2007;
Ioannidis 2008). Considering this position, a subsidiary
question should be: could a unified concept of plasticity be
considered as a key concept in the debate?
Some biologists try to answer Wallace’s challenge by
claiming that developmental biology and evolution are on
the same footing (Hall 1999). For instance, Brian K. Hall
argues: ‘‘Neither developmental nor evolutionary change
can be explained by genes alone’’5 (Hall 2003, p. 220).
Assuming this position, he focuses on the obvious distinc-
tion between the genes and the phenotype asking: ‘‘What
components and processes lie between the inherited geno-
type and phenotypes?’’ Development is seen as the complex
internal process—a ‘‘black box’’—that receives inputs
(genes) and produces outputs (phenotypes). Following this
claim, a way to answer Wallace’s challenge is to ‘‘unlock’’
(Hall 2003) the black box and to identify what is going on
inside (analysis of the processes), in opposition to what is
going on outside (analysis of the inputs and outputs).
Despite the quite simple and exciting promise offered by
this proposal it is sometimes a thorny problem, even for
these theorists, to make a clear distinction between what is
going on in the black box and what is going on outside of
it. And it is sometimes difficult to see if they are really
investigating the black box itself or only its inputs and
outputs. When Hall et al. (2004) suggests that the inherited
genotype includes the phenotype of the genes itself (pro-
teins), the one-to-one relationship between a single geno-
type and a single phenotype appears compromised and
development—as the ontogenesis of the adult phenotype—
is not anymore the only process included in the black box.
Signal transduction, transcription regulation, and process-
ing must also be included as processes (Larsen 2004).
4 It was ‘‘pointless’’ in the Modern Synthesis but with the exceptions,
by no means insignificant, of the famous work of Waddington (1940),
Lerner (1954), or Schmalhausen (1949).
5 This assumption constitutes the real focus of most of the EvoDevo
studies, more than the origin and the nature of change in life, whether
it be developmental or evolutionary.
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It has been increasingly acknowledged that development
cannot be reduced to a genetic program yielding a pheno-
type. A new account of the ‘‘environment,’’ and its rela-
tionship to the developing organism, is at the root of the
change. Whereas the environment is seen most of the time,
in the Modern Synthesis, as an external factor and is
underestimated in the phenotypic change, it has become in
this last decade a main factor in the establishment of the
phenotypic novelty. In the ‘‘new introduction’’6 to his
article ‘‘Gene, Organism and Environment,’’ Lewontin
argues:
The changes that occur in an organism during its life
from conception to death depend uniquely on both
the cell constituents that are present in the fertilized
egg and on the sequence of environments through
which the organism passes in its lifetime (2001,
p. 55).
The environment is no longer composed solely of the
external environment, it involves both an internal or
‘‘somatic’’ environment (Buss 1987) that includes the
product of the genes, the cellular types, the temperature,
etc., and an external, ‘‘ecological’’ (Williams 1996)7 or
‘‘extrasomatic’’ (Buss 1987) environment that includes
more or less the physical environment, the biotic envi-
ronment, or even the social environment. Some recent
works have paid more attention to this broader environ-
ment (Hall et al. 2004; Gilbert and Epel 2009) and its
interaction with genotype during development. As a result,
what was previously considered as a ‘‘part’’ of the black
box has now become a new type of input.
This new type of input has been emphasized through the
recent use of the concept of ‘‘developmental plasticity.’’
The concept is borrowed from neural and behavioral
biology to emphasize the processes resulting from the
genotype–environment interaction and leading to pheno-
typic plasticity (what we have called the ‘‘genetic con-
ception of plasticity’’). According to Scott Gilbert,
developmental plasticity ‘‘makes it possible for environ-
mental circumstances to elicit different phenotypes from
the same genotype.’’ The author adds: ‘‘Many species have
a broad reaction norm, wherein the genotype can respond
in a graded way to environmental conditions’’ (Gilbert and
Epel 2009, p. 118 [emphasis added]). Therefore, this defi-
nition, in a textbook on development, probably sheds a new
light on the types of interaction between the different
inputs on the black box. These inputs are no longer limited
to the genetic information. They involve different types of
genotype–environment interactions, or input interaction.
The genetic conception of plasticity is investigated in a
new way.
In 2003, a collection of papers edited by Susan Oyama,
Paul Griffiths, and Russell Gray, Cycles of Contingency:
Developmental Systems and Evolution, was published. This
book puts forward a new theoretical framework baptized
‘‘developmental systems theory’’ (DST), which aims,
among others things, to emphasize the relevance of
development in evolution. In a developmental system,
every trait is produced by the interaction of many devel-
opmental resources. The gene/environment dichotomy is
considered as only one of the many ways to divide up these
interactants (Oyama et al. 2003, p. 2). The system is
defined as the sum of the interactants and processes that
produce a life cycle (Oyama et al. 2003, p. 214). The new
framework of DST introduces the assumption that devel-
opment never stops during the life of organisms and that it
is a general process of a life cycle. Based on this
assumption, a connection can be drawn between this defi-
nition of development in terms of life cycle and the concept
of developmental plasticity, defined by Gilbert (2000/2010)
as the manifestation of any genotype–environment inter-
action (both internal and external). Consequently, no sig-
nificant distinction is made between the interaction of
inputs (what is going on outside the black box) and pro-
cesses (what is going on inside the black box). Thus, a
‘‘developmental system’’ could also be called a ‘‘plastic
system,’’ which puts emphasis on the interaction of inputs
rather than on the processes themselves. In this framework
the cessation of interacting inputs, which corresponds to
the end of development, is death.
Investigation of evolution with developmental biology
has led to an apparent merge between the two concepts of
plasticity (the genetic and the developmental) into a single
broad concept of plasticity (that I call BC-plasticity). At the
same time, the broader definition of the environment has
induced a new understanding of development that includes
both morphological, behavioral, and physiological trait
formation. As a result, developmental biologists have
concluded that the temporal boundaries of development
correspond to the death of the individual and that the
organism never stops developing during its life. In a sense,
this hypothesis might be confirmed if no distinction should
appear between the new developmental use of plasticity (in
6 The article ‘‘Gene, Organism, and Environment’’ by R. C. Lewontin
(2001) first appeared in Bendall (1983), but the quotation is from a
‘‘new introduction’’ to this article that Lewontin produced specially
for the book Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and
Evolution, pp. 55–57.
7 Williams refers to the old external environment with the notion of
ecological environment to contrast with the internal environment of
the organism considered (Williams 1996).
8 The quotation is originally from Scott Gilbert (2000/2010),
Developmental Biology, 6th edn, chap. 22. In the later editions of
the book this chapter disappears but becomes part of his new book
with David Epel (2009).
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the BC-plasticity) and the old developmental conception of
plasticity (as a feature of morphological process). Several
reviews suggest that a polysemy of the notion exists (e.g.,
Pigliucci 2001; see also Fusco and Minelli 2010), and the
observation that such a polysemy often appears in a single
study suggests that a merge between the two understand-
ings is not possible.
For instance, in Phenotypic Plasticity: Beyond Nature
and Nurture, Massimo Pigliucci (2001) refers to several
experimental demonstrations of developmental ‘‘windows
of plasticity.’’ He shows that the plasticity of an organism
depends on the traits and environments considered (inputs),
but also on the timeframe during ontogeny when those
environments are experienced (processes). Jason Hoverman
and Rick Relyea (2007) demonstrate the existence of a
‘‘developmental window for trait induction’’ in some spe-
cies of freshwater snails (Helisoma trivolis). They discover
that snails form morphological defenses against water bugs
(thick shell) and possess a developmental window for
inducible defenses. This observation implies that pheno-
typic plasticity may itself be considered as flexible or
plastic. Indeed, the ability to produce different phenotypes
(the genotype–environment interaction) may change quan-
titatively depending on the period of the life. And therefore,
any input interaction may not be the same during all the life
of the organism (variability of the input interaction over
time). Note that the expression ‘‘window of plasticity’’
suggests that some temporal boundaries exist. If one con-
siders the correlation between plasticity and development
(implicit in the BC-plasticity), then if there is a ‘‘window of
plasticity,’’ one wonders what happens outside this window.
Do we have less plasticity or an absence of plasticity? Is it
possible to say that there is an absence of development
outside the window? If so, the thesis that considers extended
development, without clear-cut boundaries, based on BC-
plasticity, seems weak. Therefore, we can reconsider the
question of where to put the temporal boundaries of
development.
I have shown in this section that two conceptions of
plasticity can be distinguished: a BC-plasticity that includes
both genetic plasticity and developmental plasticity, and
does not focus exclusively on the formation of morpho-
logical traits; and a NC-plasticity that includes only
developmental plasticity, and focuses exclusively on mor-
phological processes. With BC-plasticity, development
ends with the death of the organism and starts with the first
inputs leading to a phenotypic expression. For example,
Hoverman and Relyea (2007) suggest moving away from
studies that focus on a single point in development (a single
developmental stage representative of any developmental
process) and suggest looking at the entire life cycle. I argue
that more specific attention to the NC-plasticity allows us to
look at the entire picture and to pay more attention to the
developmental process, instead of focusing mainly on the
input interaction. This perspective could lead to a broader
understanding of the developmental processes.
In the last part of this article, I focus on the conse-
quences and meanings of adopting a particular conception
of plasticity for the domain of data studied, the type of
representation and the experimental tests and quantification
used. The comparison between the two conceptions, based
on these aspects, will help us to see in which case the
boundaries of development appear more clearly.
Toward a Clarification: Linking Plasticity
and Development Together
The differences between BC- and NC-plasticity are based
on: (a) The data access: BC-plasticity is depicted in a law-
like way whereas NC-plasticity implies a comparison
between different periods of the life cycle; (b) The repre-
sentation of plasticity: X and Y axes differ in each case
depending on whether the organism’s life is included as a
parameter; (c) Experimental tests and quantification: An
examination of how plasticity is tested in both cases and
how we may quantify the amount of plasticity is another
fundamental way to distinguish between the two concep-
tions. These comparisons will allow us to make conclu-
sions about the most suitable conception of plasticity for
studying the boundaries of development.
BC-Plasticity
Most of the recent studies in biology refer to this BC-
plasticity. Many analyses have been made on the impor-
tance of environment-development interactions. Van der
Weele (1993) makes a distinction between three schools of
thought regarding these interactions: the classic Neo-Dar-
winian approach (gene-centric-view: the genetic program
is central to an understanding of development, and envi-
ronmental effects are background noise to be minimized);
the internalist approach: the development is determined
more by the internal environment (environment of the cell
and cell–cell interactions opposed to the external, biotic or
abiotic, environment), than by genes; and the construc-
tionist approach (which sees the external environment as
the dominant player in a continuous interaction with the
genotype). Nevertheless, even if these three schools of
thought look different with respect to the importance
attributed to the factors involved in the interactions, none
of them takes into account the variations of the environ-
ment-genotype interaction during lifetime. In the BC-
plasticity, plasticity is understood as a general process, and
biologists attempt to describe it in a ‘‘law-like’’ way, as
opposed to a historical way. For instance, the authors of
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DST suggest that a set of themes helps to depict develop-
mental systems (Oyama et al. 2003, chap 1). But, in a
sense, we can say that these themes determine also the
developmental system. So even if ‘‘contingency’’ is one of
these themes, it will be captured in the concept of the
‘‘developmental system.’’
I suggest that the BC-plasticity is coherent in a context
of a life-cycle perspective (see Minelli 2011), where all
types of interactions linking the inputs with phenotypes are
defined as plastic processes. Development is considered to
be a result of these kinds of interaction and, for this reason,
the boundaries of development depend on the presence of
the input interactions.
Data Access
In most of the studies, plasticity is described for a given
phenotypic trait and concerns intraspecific environment–
genotype interactions. Because of their notable stability9
(‘‘Mean phenotypic value’’ in Fig. 1), the animal models
usually described in developmental biology—such as
Drosophila, Zebrafish, frog or sea urchin—are not the kind
of organisms depicted in phenotypic plasticity studies. In
these studies, species for which the external environment
plays an important role are emphasized (e.g., the sex ratio
of reptiles depending on temperature, the patterns and
colors of butterflies depending on season). Animal models
systems have been criticized for not being representative
enough of the broad majority of the animal kingdom
(Bolker 1995). This same criticism might be addressed
to the studies of plasticity (e.g., Brakefield et al. 1996;
Nijhout 1991; Pener 1991). The specificity of the models
emphasized prevents us from having a generalized view on
the different mode of interaction of the genotype with the
environment and suggest that the mode of interaction is
unique. If the input interactions are considered in general,
that is, without distinction between them over time, then,
only one type of boundary for development, which is
equivalent with ‘‘no interaction,’’ might be considered.
If the differences between the processes (interactions
throughout life) are emphasized, different types of bound-
aries for the development might also appear depending on
the features of these processes.
This observation leads us to another important feature of
BC-plasticity studies: the referential time scale. If any, it is
mainly an evolutionary one (Bradshaw 1965; Schlichting
1986; Sultan 1987; West-Eberhard 1989; Scheiner 1993;
Schlichting and Smith 2002). The phenotypic change, over
time, is only considered from an evolutionary perspective
and, if not, comparisons in the rate of plasticity during life are
seldom detailed. In this broad conception, plasticity looks
like a constant physiological process during the life of
organisms. For this reason, it may be compared to other
regulatory processes including both physiological and/or
behavioral mechanisms. Piersma and Lindstro¨m (1997)
argue for a connection between physiological plasticity,
behavioral plasticity, and developmental plasticity, referring
for instance to organs’ size change over short periods of time
(e.g., organ adjustments during lactation or migration-
related changes in the digestive system). In this perspective,
it looks like development lasts all life. More recently, biol-
ogist Mary Jane West-Eberhard (2003) has emphasized this
connection in a more general way. In Developmental Plas-
ticity and Evolution, she develops a general theory in an
attempt to frame the entire question of phenotypic novelties,
based on the statement that ‘‘a fundamental quality shared by
behavior and development is condition-sensitivity: both are
partly directed by circumstances’’ (West-Eberhard 1992).
West-Eberhard introduces a broader notion of develop-
mental plasticity, in order to demonstrate the range of the
underlying mechanisms of input interaction. West-Eber-
hard’s main purpose is to draw a link between development
and behavior. Therefore, the conception of plasticity
implicitly reinforces the role of the inputs (condition-sensi-
tivity) but it leaves our understanding of the process
unchanged. Plasticity is defined as ‘‘input interaction,’’
meaning whatever variations might appear during the life of
the organisms. The domain data for the BC-plasticity
emphasizes the homogeneity of a developmental process,
understood as the result of any input interaction. The tem-
poral boundaries, if investigated, will rely on the existence of
such interaction. However, as I will show in the next section,
the BC-plasticity is faced with some significant problems.
Representation of BC-plasticity
This representation (Fig. 1) illustrates the confusion that
exists in the BC-plasticity between the different meanings
of plasticity. Plasticity is both represented by the slope of
the line (here called ‘‘developmental plasticity’’) and the
line itself (here called ‘‘reaction norm’’). This type of rep-
resentation is found frequently in published reports, mostly
as an artifact, result of an experimental device to show the
variation (e.g., Pigliucci 1997). In any case it highlights the
genotype–environment interaction and its phenotypic
result. In the BC-plasticity, any input interaction is inter-
preted in developmental terms. Indeed, comparisons
between different reaction norms during the same life cycle
are rarely made. Therefore, through this representation,
development doesn’t appear as a process with temporal
boundaries but as a general property of living beings.
9 In 1985, one conclusion and recommendation of the National
Research Council (United States) concerning the models for biomed-
ical research was, among other things, to favor genetic uniformity of
organism, where applicable (NRC 1985, p. 73).
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Experimental Tests and Quantification
It appears, considering the representation above, that BC-
plasticity is tested in taking into account ‘‘the array of
phenotypes that will be developed by the genotype over an
array of environments’’ (Gupta and Lewontin 1982). The
notion of ‘‘phenotype’’ as defined by Mary Jane West-
Eberhard (2003, p. 31) is exactly the same as the one
introduced by Johannsen (1911), for the first time, to
describe the genotype–phenotype distinction: ‘‘The phe-
notype includes all traits of an organism other than its
genome.’’ In the life-cycle perspective, an organism is
usually depicted as in an endless cycle of temporary phe-
notypic forms. Individual life cycles are also connected—
some phenotypes are inherited from the previous genera-
tion through the egg cell—and this points out cross-gen-
erational phenotypic continuity. However, with this
conception there is no clear-cut boundary to the develop-
ment, not even death. In this conception, development is
synonymous with evolution. BC-plasticity brings together
these cross-generational phenotypes. The implicit link
between these phenotypic expressions is depicted by the
notion of interchangeability: ‘‘Phenotypes responsive to
the environment can make them [also] responsive to inputs
specified by genes, to manipulation by parents and para-
sites, and to internal interactions among parts […].
Responsiveness to all of these different influences gives
rise to development […]’’ (West-Eberhard 2003, p. 93
[emphasis added]). A change in one environmental com-
ponent (internal or external) may give rise to a plurality of
phenotypes. This phenomenon is represented by the reac-
tion norm (Fig. 1), which is a property of the genome and
can also be selected. Because plasticity is not a synonym
but an attribute of the reaction norm, different genotypes
are expected to differ in the direction and amount of
plasticity that they are able to express (Gotthard and Nylin
1995; Via et al. 1995). But most of the time a reaction
norm is only seen as a type of plasticity. Consequently,
development is considered as a result at the phenotypic
level of plasticity. But by development as the sum of the
input interactions during life, the BC-plasticity is not able
to delineate any clear-cut boundaries.
NC-Plasticity
Having described BC-plasticity and its consequences for
the boundaries of development, the aim of this section is to
propose another conception of plasticity that we call
‘‘narrow conception’’ (NC-plasticity). Indeed, I suggest
that some features of the developmental process are not
depicted with the BC-plasticity. In order to show the dif-
ferences between the two conceptions, the same criteria
used to describe BC-plasticity are now used to analyze the
NC-plasticity: the data access, its representation, and the
experimental tests and quantification.
What I call NC-plasticity refers to the developmental
conception of plasticity that I described in the first part.
This conception is linked to ontogenesis. Contrary to BC-
plasticity, NC-plasticity focuses on development as a his-
torical process and on morphology as the change over time
of input interaction. Developmental boundaries depend no
longer on the existence or absence of input interactions but
on the existence or absence of the change, over time, of the
input interactions, and so on the processes.
Data Access
Contrary to the broad conception, NC-plasticity relies on
morphological plasticity (usually irreversible) as opposed to
behavioral plasticity, which is considered as similar and an
addition to physiological plasticity. The latter is manifested
for example in plants’ alterations of photosynthetic rates in
response to light availability and mammals’ changes of
respiration rate or production of red cells in response to
alterations in oxygen availability (Cavalli-Sforza 1974). The
former is manifested in limb development and suggests an
irreversible change. Very few studies deal with this dis-
tinction and some of them are not really clear on their pur-
pose. For instance, Diggle (1993, 1994) establishes in his
studies on Solanum hirtum that sex determination depends
not only on plasticity to resource10 (reaction norm), but also
on the developmental architecture of the plant (morpho-
genesis). Floral sex is underdetermined until the floral buds
reach 9–10 mm in length. If the buds are developing in a
basal position, they turn into hermaphrodite flowers
regardless of the environmental conditions. Diggle termed
this dependency of plasticity on the previous developmental
Fig. 1 Representation of BC-plasticity including both the reaction
norm (the line) and developmental plasticity (the slope of the line)
10 Access to the resources is artificially increased or decreased (see
Diggle 1994).
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history of the organism ‘‘ontogenetic contingency.’’ This
experiment implies that sex determination in Solanum hir-
tum can’t be explained with a simple reaction norm or in
looking at input interaction (BC-plasticity). A timescale
must be introduced. This timescale is based on the idea that
development might be considered as a ‘‘historical rather than
a programmatic [or law-like]11 phenomenon;’’ furthermore,
‘‘Each stage in the progressive structural and compositional
reshaping of the embryo is both the effect of earlier and the
cause of later developmental transactions’’ (Stent 1985,
p. 1). With this temporality it is possible to describe the
establishment of a ‘‘developmental architecture of the plant’’
or a ‘‘window of plasticity’’ (NC-plasticity), in the case of
the freshwater snails mentioned previously.
BC-plasticity focuses on hypothetical alternatives
between different phenotypes, whereas NC-plasticity aims
to bring in the same picture different phenotypes expressed
over time by the same organism. If we consider this
temporal perspective, the question is: When does the
morphological process end? The study of NC-plasticity,
understood as the variation of the input interaction over
time, may give an answer to this question. The temporal
boundaries of development depend on the end of plasticity
understood as a feature of morphological process.
Representation of NC-Plasticity
In the NC-plasticity’s representation (Fig. 2), the X-axis and
the Y-axis are different from the previous representation
(Fig. 1). A time scale is introduced and the genotype–
environment (input) interaction corresponds to the Y-axis.
Therefore, the variation of the input interaction appears over
the lifespan. I suggest that plasticity, as a feature of mor-
phological process (NC-plasticity), represents the change of
this input interaction over time. Development ends when
variability of the interaction stops. The first two parts of the
diagram could be applied to some multicellular organisms
but not the third part. The first part represents variation of the
interaction over time (cascade of chain reactions); the
development ends when the ‘‘adult stage’’ (second part)
starts, where the interaction remains constant, keeping the
organism in equilibrium. ‘‘Phenotypic plasticity’’ can be
identified during this second stage. Some organisms may
express another ‘‘wave’’ of morphogenesis if a new wave of
variation in genotype–environment interaction appears.
Some organisms may never express such variation in their
genotype–environment interaction during their life. We will
detail in the next section what this ‘‘wave of variation in the
genotype–environment interaction’’ means.
Experimental Test and Quantification
Few studies are devoted only to NC-plasticity compared to
BC-plasticity. However, some very interesting studies,
dealing with this issue, have been developed recently (e.g.,
Salazar-Ciudad et al. 2003; Forgacs and Newman 2005).
These studies investigate the specificity of morphological
processes compared to behavioral and/or physiological
processes. They focus on the transition levels for biological
organizations. These specific periods, which can be
expressed during the life of some species, correspond to a
change in the mode of interaction for the genotype and its
environment. If one considers a cascade of molecular
events (chain reaction) over time, there is a high degree of
plasticity. It is not a result of the amount of input inter-
action (BC-plasticity) but it is a result of the quick change,
over time, of the input interaction that will lead to the
appearance of emergent properties,12 understood as a fea-
ture of morphological process (e.g., cell polarity, epithelial
folding) (Newman and Bhat 2008). These emergent prop-
erties lead the developing organism into different states
(e.g., from unicellular to multicellular, from multicellular
uniformity to multicellular heterogeneity). In this concep-
tion, development would start with the first expression of
an emergent property and would stop when equilibrium is
reached, when environment–genotype interaction stops
changing so quickly over time (Salazar-Ciudad et al. 2001).
Some evidence seems to support this assumption.
Fig. 2 Representation of NC-plasticity as a feature of morphological
process, understood as the variability of genotype–environment
(input) interaction during the lifetime
11 Addition is mine.
12 Emergent entities (properties or substances) arise out of more
fundamental entities and yet are novel or irreducible with respect to
them. The new entities are more than the sum of the parts they are
composed of. In the case of multicellular organisms, cellular




In a paper from 2003, Salazar-Ciudad et al. show that
cell differentiation may equilibrate faster than cell move-
ment (see Laplane 2011). Molecular and physical interac-
tion effects may not have the same consequence whether
physical equilibrium is reached or not. Forgacs and New-
man (2005) examine the case of limb morphogenesis. They
depict two-dimensional simulations to show the ‘‘robust-
ness’’ of embryonic limb development. These simulations
emphasize the boundaries of limb development (‘‘when the
equilibrium is reached’’) and the role of developmental
constraints. For instance, in the pattern of cleavage, con-
straint is the distribution of yolk, a dense and viscous
material; in the cell shape, constraints are linked to the
incompressible nature of the liquid drop—its volume is
constant while its shape can change—and to gravity. In
other words, developmental constraints correspond to some
associations of particular physical, genetic, and chemical
constraints. They show that ‘‘active cell movement char-
acterizes early morphological process’’ (Forgacs and
Newman 2005). This movement, which leads to the
appearance of new forms (emergent properties), must, on
the one hand, satisfy the constraints imposed by the activity
of the maternal and zygotic genes and on the other hand
should proceed according to the governing physical
mechanisms, which exert forces on the cells (causal pro-
cesses). The laws of chemical transformation also dictate
the direction of change. Time-dependent physical pro-
cesses are triggered (i.e., shape changes) that steer the
system into new equilibrium (or steady) state, which cor-
responds to a new shape, again temporary. The altered
shape of the embryo, or portion thereof, may in turn
influence the course of subsequent development. This
process is called a ‘‘protean13 process’’ (Forgacs and
Newman 2005) and I call it NC-plasticity.
During the later stages of embryogenesis, the body, as a
whole, becomes more structurally complex and function-
ally integrated. This functional integration corresponds to a
state of equilibrium (end of development). Forgacs and
Newman (2005) suggest that ‘‘basic physical mechanisms
[constraints] become correspondingly less applicable to an
understanding of the changes in the shape and form of the
entire organism as development proceeds.’’
Therefore, if we consider NC-plasticity as a protean
ability depending on the early constraints during morpho-
genesis, other boundaries could be ascribed to development
than the one with the BC-plasticity. Development ends
when limits of these basic physical and molecular con-
straints are reached, when emergent properties decrease in
the face of simple causal properties of morphological
process, leading to the end of the morphological process
and to the beginning of physiological process. Equilibrium
is reached when phenotypic change might only be depicted
by reaction norms and phenotypic plasticity (the genetic
conception of plasticity).
Conclusion
I suggested at the beginning of the article that two con-
ceptions of plasticity should be distinguished: a ‘‘genetic
conception of plasticity’’ which is linked to a description of
the reaction norm and to the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws;
and a ‘‘developmental conception of plasticity,’’ which is
based on the theory of epigenesis and on morphogenesis
studies. With the Modern Synthesis, attention has been
focused on the genetic conception of plasticity leading to
some clarifications concerning the genotype–environment
interaction. With the advent and growth of EvoDevo
debates, the distinction between the two conceptions has
tended to disappear, leading to a merged conception that
I have called BC-plasticity. I have shown that this broad
conception has been used in order to answer what Evo-
Devo biologists have called ‘‘Wallace’s Challenge’’
Table 1 Distinction of the two conceptions of plasticity and consequences for the developmental boundaries
NC-plasticity (narrow) BC-plasticity (broad)
Definition Developmental conception of plasticity as a feature of
morphological process
Phenotypic plasticity ? developmental plasticity (as




End of morphological process ‘‘Development never stops’’ (Gilbert S)
Death
Biologists Larsen E, Newman SA, Salazar-Ciudad I, Mu¨ller G Gilbert S, Lewontin R, West Eberhard MJ
Theories Historical conception of development (Stent GS) Law-like conception of development: DST (Oyama S,
Griffith PE, Gray RD) and life-cycle theoryDistinction of physiological plasticity and behavioral plasticity
with morphological plasticity (Cavalli-Sforza LL) ‘‘Developmental plasticity theory’’: (West-Eberhard MJ)
13 In reference to the Greek myth of Proteus who can foretell the
future, but will change his shape to avoid having to; he will answer
only to someone who is capable of capturing him. From this feature of
Proteus comes the adjective protean: ‘‘capable of assuming many
forms,’’ ‘‘versatile,’’ or ‘‘flexible’’.
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(West-Eberhard 2003, p. 11). I have shown that Wallace’s
statement is actually not a challenge but an ‘‘awareness
program’’ for developmental biologists. Wallace high-
lighted the fact that developmental biology may address a
different perspective than what the MS was doing and may
focus specifically on the morphological processes of
organisms (the distinction between the two perspectives is
illustrated by the optical illusion sketch of the old and the
young lady). A definition of development as a process that
never stops is a consequence of a merge between the two
conceptions of plasticity within BC-plasticity. I have shown
that another perspective was possible by focusing on the
developmental conception of plasticity (NC-plasticity). I
have compared (Table 1) two distinct views (the broad
conception—BC-plasticity—and the narrow conception—
NC-plasticity). BC-plasticity suggests a definition of
development in a life-cycle perspective as a law-like pro-
cess and it is based on the traditional analysis of environ-
ment–genotype interactions. This perspective, which
claimed to challenge the Modern Synthesis, is finally quite
similar. It remains focused on the signals interaction itself
instead of taking into account the processes also. The NC-
plasticity suggests an alternative conception of develop-
ment, based on the older understanding of the notion, which
today is understood as a feature of morphological process.
Because this conception focuses more on the variation of
the genotype–environment interaction over time than on the
signals’ interaction itself, it gives another, more historical
view of development. Following Wallace’s advice, I con-
clude in favor of the thesis that development is determined
by the boundaries of the morphological process, which
depends on NC-plasticity. Further studies on the causes of
variation in the input interaction (in the vein of Salazar-
Ciudad or Newman’s studies) may provide good indications
for the identification of these developmental boundaries. It
is high time to have a closer look at the young lady!
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